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ABSTRACT
Online labor markets give people in poor countries direct
access to buyers in rich countries. Economic theory and
empirical evidence strongly suggest that this kind of access
improves human welfare. However, critics claim that abuses
are endemic in these markets and that employers exploit
unprotected, vulnerable workers. I investigate part of this
claim using a randomized, paired survey in which I ask work-
ers in an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk)
how they perceive online employers and employers in their
host country in terms of honesty and fairness. I find that,
on average, workers perceive the collection of online employ-
ers as slightly fairer and more honest than offline employers,
though the effect is not significant. Views are more polarized
in the online employer case, with more respondents having
very positive views of the online collection of employers.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics; K.4.1
[Public Policy Issues]: Use/abuse of power; K.4.2 [Social
Issues]: Employment
General Terms
Economics, Experimentation
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1. INTRODUCTION
Work conducted over the Internet by workers participating
in online labor markets has begun to attract mainstream at-
tention and much of this attention has been negative. Most
of the criticism targets low-skilled, low-paying piece-work
sites like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT), though other
sites like oDesk and Elance are also drawing scrutiny. Har-
vard Law Professor and co-founder of the Berkman Center
for Internet & Society Jonathan Zittrain recently published
an article Newsweek titled “Work the New Digital Sweat-
shops.” At a recent conference on digital labor at the New
School, the words “expropriation” or “exploitation” were on
nearly every page of the program. Critics worry that buyers
are circumventing labor laws and exploiting workers. Aside
from low pay, critics argue that workers do not know the
(potentially unethical) purpose of their work and have no
ability to organize or appeal the decisions of capricious em-
ployers [4, 2]. They also worry that much of the work is
of dubious social value, with many buyers using workers to
generate spam and write bogus product reviews.
Despite these perceived downsides of online labor markets,
they have a tremendous and potentially transformative up-
side, which is that the markets give people in poor coun-
tries access to buyers in rich countries. If this form of in-
creased virtual labor mobility has effects similar to those
of increased real labor mobility, then the emergence of on-
line labor markets should be lauded and supported; the wel-
fare gains from liberalizing restrictions on labor mobility are
truly enormous. Clemens et al. [1] consider the effect reloca-
tion to the US would have on the real wages of workers from
different countries. For the median country (Bolivia), wages
would increase by a factor of 2.7, and for the highest coun-
try (Nigeria), wages would increase by a factor of 8.4. Even
with current strict limits on migration, the World Bank esti-
mates that in 2008 remittances to developing countries were
over $305 billion, which exceeds both private capital flows
and official development aid.
The comparative advantages of the world’s poor are that
they (either individually or collectively through political in-
stitutions) are willing to accept environmental degradation,
dangerous working conditions and very low pay. In light
of this unpleasant truth, the relative virtues of digital work
are obvious: it poses no physical danger to workers, has
virtually no environmental impact and it does not require
robust host country institutions or local entrepreneurial tal-
ent. Workers can set their own hours and are not exposed to
the elements, dangerous working conditions, the vagaries of
agriculture or tyrannical bosses. Unlike labor market access
gained through physical migration, workers do not have to
live apart from their families or dissipate their earnings by
paying developed country prices for shelter, food and cloth-
ing.
We have discussed both the perceived costs and the potential
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benefits of online labor markets; good public policy will re-
quire some attempt to quantify the trade-offs under different
policy scenarios. Consider a proposal to require Amazon to
verify that each new task is not being used to generate spam.
While this may have the intended effect of reducing spam,
compliance costs might exceed the per-transaction profits,
thus pricing all work out of the market—or it might not,
leading to an overall gain in welfare. Fortunately, we do not
need to limit ourselves to speculation and conjecture: it is
easy to test hypotheses about online phenomena by running
experiments.
2. THE EXPERIMENT
In AMT, the decision whether to pay a worker is left wholly
up to the buyer; nothing stops a buyer from expropriating
the product of workers. Given that the rules tilt heavily
in favor of buyers, one might presume that employers in
AMT would regularly cheat their workers. If this is true,
then AMT workers would have dim views of the honesty
and fairness of online employers vis-a-vis offline employers
who operate in the shadow of formal sanctions for unethical
behavior. To test this proposition, I conducted a simple ex-
periment in which subjects recruited from AMT were asked
to answer one of the following questions:
• What percentage (between 0 and 100) of Employers in
your home country would you estimate treat workers
honestly and fairly?
• What percentage (between 0 and 100) of Mechani-
cal Turk Requesters would you estimate treat workers
honestly and fairly?
Subjects were randomly assigned to a question and only saw
that particular question. In other words, subjects asked
about home country bosses were not asked about requesters
and vice versa. I launched the experiment on December 23rd
and left it open for 7 days. In total, 200 subjects partici-
pated. I paid 12 cents per response, which gave an hourly
average wage of $5.68 and my total expenditure was $26.40.
Consistent with Amazon’s guidance on what constitutes a
“good” feedback score, the HIT was limited to AMT workers
with a 95% approval rating. Exactly 200 subjects completed
the HIT, but only 192 responses were usable.1 When asked
for their home country, 111 reported being from the US, 58
reported being from India and 23 reported being from some
other country.
2.1 Results
A histogram of worker responses by question type, with a
bin width of 5, is shown in Figure 1. In each panel, the mean
response is indicated with a vertical line, and 90% and 95%
confidence intervals are shown with red shaded bands around
the mean. We can see that (1) means are quite similar and
(2) that response in the online case (bottom panel) appear
more polarized, with a greater number of subjects in the
online case having very positive views of the requesters.
1The author’s website contains the raw data from AMT, the
code that cleans the data and all code used for the analysis
and plots. The main cause was workers offering a range
rather than a point estimate.
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Figure 1: Worker attitudes about online and offline
employers
We can compare mean responses in the two groups using
a linear regression of the reported percentage of honest and
fair employers, perci, on an indicator for whether the subject
was asked about online employers, AMTi = 1 or offline, host
country employers, AMTi = 0. The fitted regression line,
with robust standard errors, is:
perci = 5.208︸ ︷︷ ︸
3.58
·AMTi + 64.375︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.36
with R2 = 0.011 and N = 192. We can see that the mean
percentage was a little more than 64% and for online employ-
ers slightly more than 69%. The difference is not statistically
significant.
Confirming the graphical evidence that more workers have
very positive views of online employers compared to offline
employers, a regression of an indicator for whether the sub-
ject perceived that more than 80% of employers were honest
and fair yields a positive and highly significant coefficient on
the group assignment indicator, AMTi:
1{perci > 80} = 0.219︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.07
·AMTi + 0.219︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.04
with R2 = 0.05426 and N = 192.
There are several caveats to the findings. Experimenter ef-
fects could matter: subjects might exaggerate how honest
and fair they find AMT employers, because this question
was asked by an AMT employer. An unavoidable limitation
is that subjects are not a random sample of AMT workers—
perhaps the ones who have bad experiences quit. The 95%
cutoff might preclude the participation of a large number of
disgruntled workers, though this seems unlikely; in past ex-
periments, I have found very little difference in uptake under
different cutoffs, suggesting most workers have high scores.
3. DISCUSSION
The critique of online markets goes beyond the perceived
fairness of employers. Furthermore, worker perceptions of
fairness are not measures of actual fairness. That being said,
the experiment offers evidence that AMT workers view their
chances of being treated fairly online as being as good or bet-
ter than what they can obtain offline. Contrary to our prior
expectations, rampant exploitation is a mis-characterization.
Future research should investigate other claims related to
online markets: how prevalent are dubious tasks? Do work-
ers get repetitive stress injuries, as is often suggested? Do
workers feel they are gaining skills? Answers to these ques-
tions could help clarify the trade-offs inherent in different
policy proposals. Online work is currently a small phenom-
ena compared to the global trade in services, but it will
become far larger and will eventually attract more policy-
oriented attention. Given the welfare consequences of online
work, it would be a tragedy if supposition and conjecture
about easily and cheaply answerable empirical questions de-
termined our digital policy.
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